Tolerance in the postindustrial city: Assessing the ethnocentrism of less educated natives in 22 dutch cities by Waal, J. (Jeroen) van der & Houtman, D. (Dick)
 1 
Tolerance in the Postindustrial City 
Assessing the Ethnocentrism of Less-Educated 
Natives in 22 Dutch Cities 
Jeroen van der Waal and Dick Houtman 
 
 
 
Address of correspondence 
Jeroen van der Waal 
Department of Sociology 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Erasmus University 
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
 
Telephone 
+31-10-4088668/2085 
Fax 
+31-10-4089098 
Email 
vanderwaal@fsw.eur.nl 
 2 
Biographical notes 
 
Jeroen van der Waal (1974) is assistant professor at the department of sociology, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. His research interests are twofold. On the one 
hand he studies the impact of economic globalization and post-industrialization on social 
inequality and ethnic relations in cities in the advanced economies, on which he 
published in Urban Studies (2009, 2011). On the other hand, he is engaged in research on 
the impact of cultural change on value orientations and voting behavior in the west, on 
which he published in journals such as British Journal of Criminology (2008), 
International Political Science Review (2007), Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 
(2009), Journal for European Social Policy (2010), and Politics & Society (2007). 
 
Dick Houtman (1963) is professor of cultural sociology at the Center for Rotterdam 
Cultural Sociology (CROCUS) at Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Most 
of his research addresses cultural change in contemporary western societies, with a focus 
on its political and religious ramifications. His latest books are Farewell to the Leftist 
Working Class (with Peter Achterberg and Anton Derks 2008, New York: Transaction) 
and Religions of Modernity (edited with Stef Aupers 2010, Leiden: Brill). In recent years, 
he has also published in European Journal of Political Research, Social Forces, Politics 
& Society, Public Opinion Quarterly, British Journal of Criminology, Journal of 
European Social Policy, American Behavioral Scientist, Journal of Contemporary 
Religion, and Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.
 3 
Tolerance in the Postindustrial City 
Assessing the Ethnocentrism of Less-Educated Natives in 22 Dutch Cities 
 
Abstract 
 
This article studies whether and why less-educated natives are less ethnocentric in 
postindustrial Dutch cities than in industrial ones, as suggested by several theories in 
urban studies. A multilevel analysis of survey data collected among the native working 
populations (source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006) of 22 
Dutch metropolitan agglomerations (sources: Statistics Netherlands Statline and Atlas of 
Municipalities) confirms that those concerned are indeed less ethnocentric in the most 
postindustrial cities. This pattern proves not to stem from the better opportunities at the 
bottom end of the labor market in these cities, as the ethnic competition theory suggests, 
but from the more tolerant cultural climate in these cities, as emphasized by Richard 
Florida in his work on creative cities. 
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It has long been known that cultural and political intolerance in general, and towards 
ethnic minorities in particular, can in the west mainly be found among the less educated 
(Emzler and Frazer 1999). Recent theorizing about „new political culture cities‟ (Clark 
1996; Sharp 2007; Sharp and Joslyn 2008), „unconventional cities‟ (Rosdil 1991; Sharp 
2002) and „post-traditional cities‟ (Sharp 2007) suggests, however, that this may be less 
so in postindustrial cities than in industrial ones. This article therefore studies whether 
less-educated natives are indeed less ethnocentric in postindustrial cities than in industrial 
ones and, if so, how exactly this can be explained. It so happens that there are two 
markedly different theories that predict such a difference between industrial and 
postindustrial cities – or, more formally stated, between less and more postindustrial 
cities (for the sake of readability, we will often use the former shorthand formulation in 
what follows). 
The first theory is informed by central insights from the work of Richard Florida 
(2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) and maintains that an urban climate of cultural tolerance is 
responsible for such a difference. The second theory, which combines insights from the 
work of Saskia Sassen (2000, 2001, 2006) with the so-called „ethnic competition theory‟, 
claims that it results from better economic opportunities at the bottom end of the labor 
market in postindustrial cities. In what follows, we first elaborate these two theories, 
starting with the latter, and then test the relevant hypotheses by means of a multilevel 
analysis of ethnocentrism among the native working populations of 22 Dutch 
metropolitan agglomerations that differ in the extent to which they are postindustrial.  
 
The Economic and Cultural Climate of the Postindustrial City 
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Postindustrialism, labor-market opportunities and ethnocentrism 
According to Sassen, the transition to a postindustrial economy has vast consequences for 
the demand for less-skilled labor (2000, 2001, 2006). For two reasons, this demand is 
supposed to be higher in cities with a large share of „advanced producer services‟ (the 
hallmark of postindustrial urban development) than in industrial cities, i.e., cities where 
these services comprise only a marginal share of the urban labor force. Firstly, Sassen 
(2006, 197, cf. 2000, 142) emphasizes that “almost half the jobs in the producer services 
are lower-income jobs, and the other half are in the two highest earning classes”. The 
latter half consists of the higher-educated professionals such as financial specialists, 
accountants and consultants; the former half of the less-educated workers who 
accommodate these professionals: cleaners, servants and clerks (Sassen 2000, 14, cf. 
2006, 197). Sassen moreover maintains that the consumption patterns of well-educated 
professionals employed in the advanced producer services increase the demand for lower-
educated labor even further, because their lifestyles create employment opportunities for 
“an army of low-wage workers (…) including residential building attendants, dog-
walkers, housekeepers for the two-career family, workers in the gourmet restaurants and 
food shops, French hand laundries, and so on” (Sassen-Koob 1985, 262). 
And indeed, several studies show that urban economies with a strong and growing 
presence of advanced producer services increase the prosperity of their citizens 
irrespective of ethnicity and education level (Drennan et al. 2002), and create jobs for the 
highly as well as lowly educated. Cities with a more industrial character, on the other 
hand, have witnessed a decline of the prosperity of their citizens in recent decades – 
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especially of the less-educated stratum (Drennan et al. 2002) – and have to contend with 
high unemployment levels at the bottom end of the labor market. This has been 
documented for cities in the United States (Elliott 1999, 2004; Kasarda 1985; Kasarda 
and Friedrichs 1985) the former Federal Republic of Germany (Kasarda 1985; Kasarda 
and Friedrichs 1985), and the Netherlands (Van der Waal 2010; Van der Waal and 
Burgers 2009a, 2009b, 2011). 
Recent studies show that the already high unemployment levels among the less 
educated in Dutch industrial cities have further been aggravated by the influx of 
immigrants. Contrary to postindustrial ones, these cities have hence not been able to 
absorb this influx, so that competition between immigrants and less-educated natives is 
particularly fierce in industrial cities (Van der Waal 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).[1] 
According to several scholars in urban studies such ethnic competition spurs 
ethnocentrism among less-educated native urbanites (e.g., Fainstein, Gordon, and Harloe 
1992; King 1990; Wacquant 2008). This so-called „ethnic competition theory‟ is quite 
prominent outside urban studies, too, if only because it is based on Max Weber‟s widely 
used classical notion of „social closure‟ ([1922] 2006; cf. Roscigno, Garcia, and Bobbitt-
Zeher 2007), according to which “competition for resources leads to attempts at exclusion 
of one group by another” (Olzak 1992, 163; cf. Blalock 1956, 1967). 
According to this ethnic competition theory, then, it can in the first place be 
expected that less-educated natives are more ethnocentric than higher-educated ones 
because of their weak economic position (hypothesis 1a). Moving from the individual 
level of analysis to the city level, this theory suggests that less-educated natives in the 
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most postindustrial cities will be less ethnocentric due to these cities‟ more favorable 
economic opportunity  structures (hypothesis 2a). 
 
Postindustrialism, cultural climate and ethnocentrism 
The transition to a postindustrial economy is not only accompanied by the labor market 
changes addressed above, however, but also by changes in the cultural climate of cities: 
postindustrial cities are held to have a more tolerant cultural climate that positively 
affects the cultural tolerance of their citizens (Clark 1996; Clark and Rempel 1997; Sharp 
1996, 2002, 2007; Sharp and Joslyn, 2008). This argument figures particularly in the 
influential work of Richard Florida on the creative class and creative cities. 
According to Florida, besides technological innovation and talent, a tolerant 
cultural climate is an important pre-condition for a thriving urban economy because such 
a climate attracts members of the creative class (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). This class is 
held responsible for technological innovation and hence new forms of industriousness in 
urban economies. The question whether urban economic growth is indeed driven by this 
mechanism is widely debated (cf. inter alia Asheim and Hansen 2009; Hoyman and 
Faricy 2009; Markusen and Schrock 2006), but not directly relevant here. What is 
important is that the most postindustrial cities in both the United States (Florida 2004, 
2005) and the Netherlands (Van der Waal 2010a, 2010b) seem indeed to have the most 
tolerant cultural climate, as measured by means of Florida‟s „bohemian index‟. 
This index is based on the share of the urban population that is involved in the 
production of culture and the arts, because those concerned are assumed to be attracted by 
a tolerant urban climate (cities like San Francisco, Amsterdam, and Berlin being 
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examples par excellence). As such, according to Florida the bohemian index indicates „an 
underlying openness to diversity‟ (Florida 2002, 64, 2004, 260, 2005, 113-28) at the city 
level, that is neither simply the result of the level of cultural tolerance of urbanites 
generally, nor of these bohemians in particular (Deleon and Naff 2004; Florida 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005). The bohemian index thus aims to measure a phenomenon sui generis, 
i.e., a climate of cultural tolerance that increases levels of tolerance of individual 
urbanites in a similar way as, for instance, the manner in which the cultural climate in the 
south in the United States decreases it: irrespective of their level of education, 
southerners are more ethnocentric than in Americans in northern states (e.g., Kuklinski, 
Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Weakliem and Biggert 1999). 
What Florida‟s theory has in common with the ethnic competition theory is the 
assumption that less-educated natives are least ethnocentric in the most postindustrial 
cities. It does however propose a markedly different explanation for such a pattern. While 
according to the ethnic competition theory it is the result of better labor market 
opportunities at the bottom end of the urban labor market, Florida attributes it to a 
tolerant urban cultural climate that is more sympathetic towards cultural diversity. This 
assumption that culture instead of economic conditions is decisive for explaining 
ethnocentrism is consistent with four sets of research findings. 
The first set of findings shows that less-educated natives particularly resist 
immigrants who are ethnically and/or culturally different (Dustmann and Preston 2007; 
Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller 1993; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Sniderman 
and Hagendoorn 2007), and that they consider immigrants a cultural rather than an 
economic threat (Kluegel and Smith 1983; O‟Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Sniderman, 
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Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). The second set of 
findings suggests that the ethnocentrism of less-educated natives is rooted in their cultural 
background rather than the fierce competition over scarce resources they have to face up 
to: ethnocentrism can not, or hardly, be explained from their weak labor market position, 
measured unambiguously in terms of income or unemployment, but education is decisive 
in and of itself (Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Elchardus and Siongers 2009; Houtman, 
2001, 2003; Houtman, Achterberg and Derks 2008; Van der Waal 2010a, 2010b; Van der 
Waal and Burgers 2011; Van der Waal et al., 2010). 
 These two sets of research findings suggest that in western liberal democracies – 
and in western liberal democracies only (Weil 1985) – education affects ethnocentrism as 
a vessel for what Bourdieu (1984, 1986) has called (institutionalized) „cultural capital‟  
rather than „economic capital‟. This seems to be because such cultural capital entails a 
reflexive, „de-naturalized‟ and „de-reified‟ (Gabennesch 1972) understanding of culture 
as socially and humanly constructed and as such ultimately contingent and radically 
different from the givens of nature (Bauman 1987). In such an understanding of culture, 
one‟s „own‟ culture is not considered the norm, but understood as just one particular way 
of giving meaning to the world and engendering social order. Those with ample cultural 
capital therefore neither consider their „own‟ culture unproblematic, nor do they conceive 
of „other‟ cultures as „deviant‟ or „problematic‟, but simply observe different, changing 
and ultimately arbitrary value patterns and life styles. Those with low levels of cultural 
capital, on the other hand, conceive „social reality as encompassing a superordinate 
normative dimension, an external locus where events are determined, where moral 
authority resides, and to which men must adapt themselves‟ (Gabennesch 1972, 862-3). 
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As a result, they consider other lifestyles and value patterns as violations of the social and 
cultural order, and therefore resist the cultural diversity that immigrants and ethnic 
minorities bring in their wake.[2] 
That education does indeed affect ethnocentrism as a vessel for institutionalized 
cultural capital rather than as an indicator for economic capital is furthermore indicated 
by a third set of research findings about the relationship between an ability to actually 
understand and appreciate arts and culture (Bourdieu (1986) uses the term „embodied 
cultural capital‟) on the one hand and ethnocentrism on the other. Unlike economic 
corollaries of education such as income and unemployment, this cultural corollary of 
education is strongly related to ethnocentrism: those with a low amount of embodied 
cultural capital experience cultural diversity as more of a threat than those with ample 
embodied cultural capital, even apart from the fact that education is strongly and 
positively related to both (Elchardus and Siongers, 2009; Manevska et al., 2010; Van der 
Waal et al., 2010). This suggests that education, too, operates as an indicator for cultural 
capital rather than one‟s economic position when it comes to understanding its relation 
with ethnocentrism. 
According to this theory, then, the relationship between education and 
ethnocentrism needs to be understood from the circumstance that those with little cultural 
capital understand other lifestyles and value patterns as illegitimate deviations from a 
„non-negotiable‟ social order which demands conformity. In the eyes of those with little 
cultural capital, then, this social order is seen as being disrupted when „deviant‟ lifestyles 
and value patterns proliferate in the wake of mass immigration, arousing feelings of 
cultural insecurity and anomie.[3] Desires of restoring a stable, predictable and 
 11 
meaningful social order then inform resistance to immigrant and ethnic minority groups 
who are seen as disrupting it. 
This is indeed what the fourth and last relevant set of research findings points out, 
suggesting once again that the high levels of ethnocentrism among the less educated 
result from their cultural capital rather than their economic position. It has after all not 
only been found time and again that cultural insecurity is especially strong among the less 
educated, but also that it can hardly be attributed to their weak economic position apart 
from (allegedly) education (Elchardus and Smits 2002; De Groof and Elchardus 2009; 
Manevska et al. 2010; McDill 1961; Mulford 1968; Radkiewicz 2007). Furthermore, this 
cultural insecurity of the lower educated has often been shown to be strongly related to 
cultural intolerance generally (Achterberg and Houtman 2009; Blank 2003; Derks 2006; 
Elchardus and Smits 2002) and towards ethnic minorities in particular (Elchardus and 
Siongers 2009; Fuchs 2003; Lutterman and Middleton 1970; Manevska et al. 2010; 
McDill 1961; Mulford 1968; Radkiewicz 2007; Roberts and Rokeach 1956; Srole 1956). 
 Whereas the ethnic competition theory attributes the high level of ethnocentrism 
of less-educated natives to their weak economic position, then, this alternative theory 
suggests that it rather is their small amount of cultural capital and the cultural insecurity 
that comes with it that is decisive (hypothesis 1b). Moving from the individual level of 
analysis to the city level, the ethnic competition theory predicts that less-educated natives 
will be less ethnocentric in postindustrial cities because of the latter‟s better economic 
opportunity structures, whereas this alternative theory rather holds that it is the tolerant 
cultural atmosphere of these cities, as measured by Florida‟s bohemian index (Van der 
Waal 2010a, 2010b), that is decisive (hypothesis 2b). 
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Data and Operationalization 
 
Data. 
We will test our hypotheses with a data-set that combines city-level data for the 22 Dutch 
metropolitan agglomerations as delineated by Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek, CBS) (see appendix) with individual-level survey data on their 
populations. The latter data were retrieved from the 2004 and 2006 waves of the „Cultural 
Change in the Netherlands‟ survey (Culturele Veranderingen in Nederland), which is a 
bi-annual survey conducted by „The Netherlands Institute for Social Research‟ (Sociaal 
Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) with a sample that is representative for the Dutch population 
at large.[4] Combining two waves was necessary to attain a sufficiently large number of 
native respondents (N = 765) from the working population (18 to 65 years old) living in 
the 22 metropolitan agglomerations. These individual-level data have been combined 
with city-level data retrieved from the 2004 and 2008 wave of the „Atlas for 
Municipalities‟ (Atlas voor Gemeenten 2004 and 2008) and Statistics Netherlands 
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS).[5] 
 
Operationalization individual-level variables [6]. 
Ethnocentrism is a scale constructed out of four items that express opinions about 
immigrants and immigration. Three of these items remain very close to the theoretical 
rationale of the ethnic competition theory in that they revolve around whether „a 
foreigner‟ or „a native Dutchman‟ is considered most entitled to scarce economic 
 13 
resources, thus addressing precisely the type of distributive conflict assumed by this 
theory. The fourth item asks the respondent‟s opinion on the number of people without 
the Dutch nationality in the Netherlands (see table 1). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Economic position is measured with two indicators: income (i.e., net family income of the 
respondent) and unemployed, which codes the employed and student respondents as 1, 
and unemployed respondents as 2. 
 Education is a more ambiguous indicator for one‟s economic position than either 
income or unemployed, because it simultaneously taps into one‟s (institutionalized) 
cultural capital. It is measured as the minimum number of years of schooling needed to 
attain the highest level of education achieved by the respondent. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the results of the analyses below, we have dichotomized this variable 
into two categories of roughly equal size. Respondents with less than 16 years of 
schooling have been coded as 1 (N = 384) and those with at least 16 years as 2 (N = 381). 
Cultural participation is used next to education, because contrary to education it 
does not tap into one‟s economic position and hence constitutes a less ambiguous and 
more explicit measure of (embodied) cultural capital (cf. Houtman 2003; Manevska et al. 
2010; Van der Waal 2010b). It is measured with a widely used scale consisting of four 
questions about highbrow cultural consumption (see table 2) (e.g., DiMaggio 1982; 
DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Dumais 2002; Eitle and Eitle 2002; Katsillis and Rubinson 
1990). 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Cultural insecurity is measured with four items that closely resemble those of the 
widely used scale of Srole (1956) on this matter (table 3). 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
Operationalization city-level variables. 
Postindustrialism is measured as the share of the working population that is employed in 
the advanced producer services minus the share of the working population employed in 
manufacturing according to the Dutch SBI 93 classification (Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 
1993), which corresponds to the „ISIC Rev. 3.1‟ (International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities) of the United Nations. Advanced producer 
services is the share of the working population employed in firms classified in classes J 
(finance) or K (real estate and producer services). According to Sassen (2000, 2001, 
2006), particularly these economic activities account for the increased demand for less-
educated workers in contemporary urban economies, an assumption that has been 
corroborated for Dutch cities several times (Van der Waal 2010a, 2010b; Van der Waal 
and Burgers 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Manufacturing measures the share of the working 
population employed in firms classified in class D (manufacturing). 
 Economic opportunity structure is measured as the share of less-educated 
urbanites registered at the unemployment agency as looking for a job of at least 12 hours 
a week, the latter being the official criterion for being unemployed in the Netherlands. 
Because the unemployed are not entitled to unemployment benefits without such 
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registration, this provides us with a valid measure of the share of the less-educated 
population that is actually looking for a job to provide themselves with means for 
subsistence. This variable ranges from 4.4 through 8 percent and has been recoded in 
such a way that high scores indicate low unemployment among less-educated urbanites. 
Put differently, higher scores indicate less competition over scarce job entries at the 
bottom of the labor market and hence more labor market opportunities for those 
concerned. As Sassen assumes, this measure of economic opportunity structure does 
indeed correlate strongly with postindustrialism (Pearson‟s r = 0.442, p < 0.05, N = 22): 
the economic opportunity structure for the less educated is most favorable in the most 
postindustrial cities. 
 The bohemian index has been introduced by Florida (2002, 2004) as a 
measurement of the level of tolerance of the urban cultural climate by means of the share 
of bohemians in the urban population. More specifically, the index measures the share of 
the urban population that is involved in the production of culture and the arts (for 
instance: writers, designers, architects, composers, painters, sculptors, photographers and 
actors). The assumption that underlies this measurement is that a culturally tolerant 
atmosphere attracts these bohemians, so that the larger their relative number, the more 
tolerant the urban cultural climate will be. Index scores range from 0.07 through 2 
percent and like economic opportunity structure it is substantially correlated with 
postindustrialism (Pearson‟s r = 0.670, p < 0.01, N = 22): the most postindustrial cities 
score highest on the bohemian index and hence allegedly have the most tolerant cultural 
climate. 
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Operationalization control variables 
Next to the variables needed for testing the hypotheses there is a need to control for some 
demographic characteristics of the urban population, because these differ between cities 
and are related to ethnocentrism, too. These controls are gender (female respondents have 
been coded as 1, male respondents as 2) and age (in number of years). The analyses that 
follow will also control for the fact that the data-set combines two surveys. This will be 
done by modeling year, which codes respondents from the 2004 survey as 2004, and 
respondents from the 2006 survey as 2006. 
 Next to these individual-level control variables the analyses will use one city-level 
control variable: immigrant share. It measures the share of non-western immigrants in the 
urban population and varies from 5.3 through 33.9 percent. This share needs to be 
controlled for because it can be expected on the basis of several theories that it will affect 
the ethnocentrism of the native population (Elchardus and Siongers 2009). 
 
Assessing Ethnocentrism in Dutch Cities 
 
Before assessing the impact of the cultural and economic climate of Dutch cities on the 
ethnocentrism of their less-educated inhabitants, table 4 illustrates how indicators for a 
weak economic position relate to those for cultural capital and cultural insecurity. The 
table shows the zero-order correlations above the diagonal and the partial correlations 
controlled for level of education below it. The zero-order correlations confirm that level 
of education is an ambiguous indicator for both economic position and cultural capital: it 
is positively related to income and cultural participation alike. This means that the 
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negative relationship between level of education and ethnocentrism that has so often been 
found can in itself not unequivocally be interpreted as confirming either of the two 
theories outlined above. 
  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 The correlations below the diagonal reveal that contrary to education, cultural 
participation is not an ambiguous indicator for one‟s cultural capital: controlled for 
education, it neither correlates with income, nor with unemployed. This means that a 
relationship between cultural participation and ethnocentrism, unlike a relationship 
between education and ethnocentrism, can unequivocally be interpreted as culturally 
rather than economically based. The correlations below the diagonal reveal furthermore 
that, controlled for education, cultural insecurity is not related to income either. To the 
extent that cultural insecurity can account for the ethnocentrism of less-educated natives, 
the latter is hence rooted in their limited amount of cultural capital rather than in their 
weak economic position. 
 A comparison of the correlations above the diagonal with those below it moreover 
indicates that although people with high incomes have more embodied cultural capital 
and are less culturally insecure (above diagonal), this can be fully explained by their 
higher level of education (below diagonal). In other words: the interest in highbrow 
culture and the low level of cultural insecurity found among the rich is not rooted in their 
wealth, but in their higher level of education. This means that the ethnic competition 
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theory is only confirmed if we find effects of income and/or being unemployed or not on 
ethnocentrism that cannot be explained away by these cultural variables.  
 As the hypotheses need be tested on data with a multilevel structure – 765 
respondents in 22 metropolitan agglomerations – there is need for multilevel modeling. 
Table 5 therefore starts with a null model, which shows that five percent of the variance 
in ethnocentrism exists at city level (0.05 / (0.05 + 0.95)), and consequently ninety-five 
percent exists at the individual level (0.95 / (0.05 + 0.95)). As shown time and again in 
previous studies, in model 1 education is negatively related to ethnocentrism: higher-
educated natives are less ethnocentric than less-educated ones.[7] The question is whether 
this can be interpreted as a cultural effect, an economic effect, or both. To find this out, 
the non-ambiguous indicators for one‟s economic position are entered into model 2, while 
the non-ambiguous indicators for one‟s cultural position are entered into models 3 and 4. 
 
[table 5 about here] 
 
 Model 2 shows that of the two indicators for one‟s economic position only income 
has the that the ethnic competition theory predicts: being unemployed has no effect 
whatsoever.[8] The income effect is moreover rather weak and hardly reduces the 
relationship between education and ethnocentrism, even though that is what one would 
expect if education would operate here as an indicator for a weak economic position. This 
means that hypothesis 1a needs to be rejected: less-educated natives are not more 
ethnocentric than higher-educated ones because of their weaker economic position. 
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Model 3 shows that cultural participation, an unambiguous indicator for cultural 
capital,  is negatively related to ethnocentrism as could be expected on the basis of the 
cultural theory: those with ample cultural capital are less ethnocentric than those with 
little cultural capital.[9] Including cultural participation  does reduce the relationship 
between education and ethnocentrism, to be sure, but does not at all wipe out the latter. 
This is in accordance with other studies that have also demonstrated that as drivers of 
cultural tolerance institutionalized (education) and embodied (cultural participation) 
cultural capital operate largely independently (Achterberg and Houtman 2006; Houtman 
2000; Houtman, Achterberg and Derks 2008; Van der Waal 2010a, 2010b; Van der Waal 
et al. 2010). 
Model 4 assesses whether it is indeed cultural insecurity that underlies the 
ethnocentrism of those with little cultural capital and points out that it actually does. 
Entering cultural insecurity (which is substantially positively related to ethnocentrism as 
studies have shown time and again) leads to a considerable decline in the relationship 
between education and ethnocentrism, while the one between cultural participation and 
the latter is even completely explained away.[10] Taking into account that, controlled for 
education, cultural insecurity is not related to unambiguous indicators for one‟s economic 
position (table 4), education thus seems to be operating as an indicator for one‟s cultural 
capital, and not as an indicator for one‟s economic position. It is consequently their 
limited cultural capital and the high level of cultural insecurity that accompanies it, and 
not their weak economic position, that makes less-educated natives more ethnocentric 
than higher-educated ones.[11] Hypothesis 1b is therefore confirmed: the ethnocentrism 
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of less-educated natives can be explained by their small amount of cultural capital and the 
cultural insecurity that comes with it.[12] 
The question remains whether less-educated natives in the most postindustrial 
cities are least ethnocentric, and if so, whether this has economic and/or cultural roots. 
This will be answered in four steps. The first one is made in model 5 by entering 
postindustrialism and assessing whether education has a significant random slope, which 
proves to be the case.[13] This random slope indicates that the relationship between 
education and ethnocentrism differs among Dutch cities. The positive and significant 
effect of postindustrialism furthermore shows that the population in the most 
postindustrial cities is least ethnocentric. 
The second step is taken in model 6 by entering the interaction-effect of 
postindustrialism with education.[14] This interaction-effect is positive and significant, 
which is in accordance with what both theories addressed in this article predict: the levels 
of ethnocentrism of less- and higher-educated natives differ less in the most postindustrial 
cities. This brings us to the third step: assessing whether this pattern comes about through 
the mechanism that is assumed by the ethnic competition theory or by the one suggested 
by Florida‟s theory (models 7a and 7b, respectively).  
A comparison of model 7a with model 7b shows that only Florida‟s theory can 
account for the circumstance that the gap in ethnocentrism between less- and higher-
educated natives is narrower in the most postindustrial cities.[15] Economic opportunity 
structure and its interaction-effect with education clearly do not underlie this pattern 
(model 7a): they do not yield significant coefficients and consequently do not affect the 
interaction-effect of postindustrialism with education. Entering the bohemian index and 
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its interaction with education, on the contrary, yields significant coefficients that are in 
the expected direction and account for the narrower gap in ethnocentrism between less- 
and higher-educated natives in the most post-industrial cities (model 7b). In sum, the 
narrowness of this gap in the most postindustrial cities cannot be explained by the ample 
opportunities at the bottom end of the labor market in these cities, but by the more 
tolerant cultural climate, as measured with Florida‟s bohemian index. Hypothesis 2a 
hence needs to be rejected: less-educated natives are not less ethnocentric in the most 
postindustrial cities due to the better economic opportunity structure there. 
Of course, a narrow gap in ethnocentrism between less- and higher-educated 
natives does in itself say nothing about the actual levels of ethnocentrism in both groups. 
To test hypothesis 2b, we need to find out whether less-educated natives in the most 
postindustrial cities are actually less ethnocentric than in the least postindustrial ones. 
This requires an additional analysis for less-educated natives (less than 16 years of 
education, model 1a) and higher-educated natives (at least sixteen years of education, 
model 1b) separately.[16] Table 6 demonstrates that, controlled for demographic 
composition and immigrant share, both educational categories are less ethnocentric in 
cities that score highest on the bohemian index. Put differently, both less- and higher-
educated natives are least ethnocentric in cities with a more tolerant cultural atmosphere. 
Figure 1 depicts these results graphically. This confirms hypothesis 2b: less-educated 
natives in the most postindustrial cities are least ethnocentric because of the tolerant 
cultural atmosphere in these cities. 
 
[table 6 about here] 
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[figure 1 about here] 
 
Conclusions and Debate 
 
Two strands of literature justify the assumption that less-educated natives will be less 
ethnocentric in postindustrial Dutch cities than in industrial ones. The first theory on this 
matter combines the ethnic competition theory with the research finding that in the 
former cities job-competition between immigrants and natives is lowest due to high labor 
demand at the bottom end of the labor market. Although our analysis confirms that less-
educated natives are indeed less ethnocentric in the most postindustrial cities, this proves 
however not be driven by these more abundant labor market opportunities. On the one 
hand, this may seem a remarkable finding, particularly in the light of the strong 
distributive overtones of our operationalization of ethnocentrism, which was largely 
based on questions concerning the distribution of scarce resources among „foreigners‟ 
and „native Dutchmen‟. On the other hand, however, this finding is not remarkable at all, 
because it resonates with reviews of the bulk of ethnocentrism studies by Hainmüller and 
Hiscox (2007) and Wimmer (2000) that also lead to the conclusion that most empirical 
evidence is at odds with the ethnic competition theory. 
 The second explanation that was put to the test assumes that in the most 
postindustrial cities there is a more tolerant cultural atmosphere than in the least 
postindustrial ones, which negatively affects the ethnocentrism of the less educated. Our 
findings support this assumption. At the individual level, the ethnocentrism of less-
educated natives proves to be rooted in their limited amount of cultural capital and the 
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cultural insecurity this brings in its wake. At the city level, the lower level of 
ethnocentrism of less-educated natives in the most postindustrial cities proves to result 
from the more tolerant cultural atmosphere in those cities. 
 It is important to point out that previous studies that have ranked cities according 
to the Bohemian index have merely assumed that the latter is a valid indicator for cultural 
tolerance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that actually offers 
confirmatory evidence for this, so as to validate Florida‟s index: inhabitants of cities that 
score highest on the index are indeed least ethnocentric. Yet, one can still wonder 
whether Florida‟s bohemian index actually measures the tolerance of the urban cultural 
atmosphere in a valid way, because it may of course capture other features of cities as 
well. We believe nonetheless that the three most obvious objections, and hence 
alternative interpretations of its effect on ethnocentrism, are ruled out by the findings we 
have reported above. In the first place, one may wonder whether the effect of the 
bohemian index on the ethnocentrism of less-educated urbanites may not simply be a 
result of the high level of tolerance of the bohemians themselves. We consider this very 
unlikely, not only because the bohemians constitute a very small part of the urban 
population (0.07 through 2 percent), but also because bohemians tend to be higher-
educated rather than less-educated. 
 In the second place, one may wonder whether the bohemian index does not affect 
the ethnocentrism of less-educated natives as an alternative indicator for (the absence of) 
job-competition between migrants and the native population after all. The presence of a 
large share of bohemians may for instance in itself yield substantial labor demand for 
less-educated urbanites, and may because of that reduce job competition between 
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immigrants and less-educated natives at the bottom end of the labor market. This 
alternative interpretation of the effect of the bohemian index on the ethnocentrism of less-
educated urbanites is however ruled out by the circumstance that we have already 
controlled for the economic opportunities at the bottom end of the labor market in our 
analyses. Moreover, this interpretation cannot account for the finding that the bohemian 
index reduces the ethnocentrism of the higher-educated, too. 
 Thirdly, the bohemian index may indicate the job-competition between 
immigrants and the native population in a more complex way if it somehow captures the 
degree of ethnic segmentation at the bottom end of the urban labor market, i.e., the degree 
to which immigrants and natives find employment in different segments of the urban 
labor market. If such would be the case, the negative effect of the bohemian index on the 
ethnocentrism of the less-educated could indicate that the latter are less ethnocentric in 
postindustrial cities, because they face less ethnic competition in postindustrial cities after 
all, as suggested by the ethnic competition theory. If such would be the case, we would 
expect to find a similar effect of the economic opportunity structure for less-educated 
urbanites, which does however prove not to exist, as we have seen (which is all the more 
problematic, because this constitutes the more direct and hence arguably more valid 
measurement for ethnic competition). Therefore, we consider this alternative 
interpretation of the effect of the bohemian index on the ethnocentrism of less-educated 
urbanites not very plausible either.  
 Needless to say, although we feel that these three alternative interpretations of the 
effect of the bohemian index on the ethnocentrism of less-educated urbanites are less 
plausible than Florida‟s own interpretation, research into the validity of his index as an 
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indicator for the culturally tolerant atmosphere of cities, and on how exactly such a 
climate affects the ideas of urbanites, is clearly called for. 
 Another question that calls for further scrutiny is whether and how far our 
findings travel beyond the Dutch case. Is it likely that similar patterns exist in other 
western countries? This is of course first of all an open empirical question, but the small 
geographical size of the Netherlands makes it reasonable to expect that city-level 
differences in cultural tolerance will be larger rather than smaller in other western 
countries. It is after all likely that the limited distances between the Dutch metropolitan 
agglomerations will reduce these differences to levels below these in larger countries, 
with the United States as the most extreme case in point, of course. 
 This brings us to a final and more general point. In 1996, Elaine Sharp has 
stressed that „the elevation of interests over values as the focus of inquiry in political 
science leaves the matter of morals-based social conflict on the periphery of the 
intellectual enterprise‟ (1996, 741). Eleven years later, she made a similar claim, noting 
that „if the urban politics field has become marginalized, it is because the field has 
neglected to develop a contemporary, theoretically grounded version of cultural 
explanation to go along with its attention to institutions and political economy‟ (Sharp 
2007, 55). We cordially agree with these observations, but wish to point out that such an 
emphasis on economic explanations for social and cultural phenomena is hardly limited 
to the field of urban politics, but applies to political sociology and political science at 
large, and in fact even to the social sciences generally (cf. Houtman 2003; Kumar 1978, 
2004). The customary labeling of the increase in the political salience of cultural issues in 
western societies as an emergence of „postindustrial‟ politics is already a telling case in 
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point (e.g., Betz 1994; Clark and Lipset 2001; Clark and Rempel 1997; Inglehart 1990; 
Kischelt 1997). This widely used label is informed by the equally widely held assumption 
that it is in fact the socio-economic transition to a postindustrial economy that is 
responsible for this change in the political climate. Instead of making such far-fetched 
assumptions about a decisive role of socio-economic variables, we consider it more 
appropriate to systematically study their empirical validity whenever such is possible. 
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Notes 
[1] This finding indicates that, as far as the allocation of natives and immigrants is 
concerned, Dutch urban labor markets are not fully segmented. If all immigrants would 
find employment in different labor-market segments than natives would do, there would 
be no competition over scarce job opportunities between those two groups at all. This is 
of course not to say that there is no segmentation of Dutch urban labor markets 
whatsoever – be it between ethnic groups or between any other social groups for that 
matter –, for such segmentation comes in many forms (cf. Loveridge and Mok 1979). 
[2] According to Bourdieu (1984) cultural capital fulfils a status function. As such, it 
serves exclusionary practices and the reproduction of status differences (cf. Houtman 
2003, chapter 8). Needless to say, our use of the notion of cultural capital as an ability to 
understand and appreciate cultural differences differs from Bourdieu‟s use of the concept, 
yet is not incompatible with it. Bourdieu simply focuses on other consequences of 
differences in cultural capital than the ones studied in this article. 
[3] The experienced absence of a meaningful social order goes by many other names than 
cultural insecurity or anomie, such as personal or psychological insecurity. We do 
however stick to the former labels, as these are most commonly used in studies on the 
relation of that phenomenon with tolerance towards outgroups (cf. Radkiewicz 2007). 
[4] http://www.scp.nl/. 
[5] http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/. 
[6] All variables in the analyses have been standardized. 
[7] Using four degrees of freedom (four variables have been added) leads to a decline in 
deviance of 60.52 (2069.01- 2008.49). Therefore, model 1 is a significant improvement in 
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relation to the null model, for according to the chi square distribution there is need for 
mere decline of 9.488 in deviance to be significant at the 5 percent level. 
[8] It is a significant improvement of model 1 ((2008.49 – 2001.71) > 5,991). 
[9] Model 3 is a significant improvement of model 2 (2001.71 – 1990.56 > 3.841). 
[10] Model 4 is a significant improvement of model 3 ((1990.56 - 1951.44) > 3.841).  
[11] It needs to be emphasized that no incontestable assumptions can be made (nor need 
to be made) about the causal ordering of cultural capital and cultural tolerance. For in 
liberal democracies, cultural open-mindedness is just as likely to spark interest in 
„highbrow‟ culture than the other way around, if only because much contemporary art 
tends to question, deconstruct, and disrupt the legitimacy of the existing social and 
cultural order (Bell 1976; Jensen 1995). The same goes for the relationship between level 
of education and cultural tolerance, for open-mindedness is of course a major cultural 
resource in grasping the complex and abstract issues associated with higher education. 
The most reasonable assumption is hence that cultural capital and cultural tolerance 
mutually reinforce each other, as inWeberian „elective affinity‟ as compared to causality 
(Houtman 2003, chapter 8). This does not pose a problem for our analysis in this paper, 
because its conclusion that the ethnocentrism of less-educated natives does not stem from 
their weak economic position is independent of this issue of causal ordering. 
[12] The theory that a limited amount of cultural capital and its concomitant cultural 
insecurity instead of a weak economic position underlies the ethnocentrism of the lower 
educated resonates with the social capital explanation that has most notably been 
formulated by Putnam (2000). At closer scrutiny, the former might even be a valuable 
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addition to the latter, because Putnam‟s explanation seems to lack a clear mechanism that 
relates social capital to cultural tolerance. 
 On the one hand, Putnam expects that people who are embedded in diverse social 
networks and who are politically involved are more tolerant towards outgroups than the 
socially isolated. How this exactly comes about is however not very clear, partly because 
he considers tolerance a result of (2000: 356) as much as an indicator for social capital 
(2000: 362) (cf. Wilson 2001: 225). Yet, the most obvious interpretation seems basically 
identical to our cultural capital interpretation: those who have contact and deliberate with 
a wide range of different people get used to people with ideas and values that differ from 
their own. And the other way around, of course: those who are able to understand and 
appreciate cultural diversity are more likely to become embedded in culturally diverse 
social networks and to become politically involved. 
 On the other hand, in his more recent work Putnam (2007) argues that 
immigration leads to a decline in social capital, at least in the short run. Again, how this 
exactly comes about is not clear, but his study shows that increasing ethnic diversity is 
related to low levels of trust, altruism and community cooperation. This observation 
seems in line with the explanation used in this article that resistance towards cultural 
diversity is rooted in cultural insecurity. The cultural disorder that increasing cultural 
diversity brings in its wake is what according to that explanation sparks cultural 
insecurity and makes the culturally insecure ethnocentric. This might very well be the 
underlying mechanism for Putnam‟s negative relationships between increasing ethnic 
diversity on the one hand and trust, altruism and community cooperation on the other. 
[13] Model 5 is a significant improvement of model 4 ((1951.44-1945.19) > 5.991). 
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[14] Model 6 is a significant improvement of model 5 ((1945.19 – 1942.75) > 1.642). 
[15] Model 7a is not ((1942.75 -1940.29) < 6.251), but model 7b is ((1942.75 – 1935.44) 
> 6.251) a significant improvement of model 6.  
[16] Model 1a is a significant improvement of the null model ((1127.46-1117.40) > 
9.488). Model 1b is only a significant improvement of the null model if the bohemian 
index is entered into the model ((859.99-856.45) >2.706) without the control variables, 
for the latter do all yield insignificant coefficients and the coefficient of the bohemian 
index is rather weak ((859,99-854,23) < 9,488). However, to show the reader that the 
coefficient of the bohemian index is not spurious and attributable to the demographic 
composition of Dutch cities, we report the model that also includes the control variables.
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Tables, figures and captions figures 
Table 1: measurement ethnocentrism.  
Items Factor 
loadings 
Suppose there are two employees that differ in one respect, but are 
equal in all others. If only one of them can be considered for 
promotion, who should it be? [a foreigner / should not matter / a 
Dutchman] 
0.74 
Suppose there are two employees that differ in one respect, but are 
equal in all others. If one of them needs to be dismissed because of 
economic reasons, who should it be?  [a Dutchman / should not 
matter / a foreigner] 
0.52 
We would like to know who you consider most entitled to a house 
in time of shortage of housing. [foreign family / should not matter 
/ a Dutch family] 
0.79 
What do you think in general of the number of people with another 
nationality living in our country? [too many / many, but not too 
many / not too many] 
0.65 
R² 46.41 
Cronbach‟s α 0.61 
N 765 
Source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006  
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Table 2: measurement cultural participation 
Items Factor loadings 
How many times did you visit a classical music concert in the past 
12 months? [not / once / 2-3 times / 4-11 times / once a month] 
0.80 
How many times did you visit a museum in the past 12 months? 
[not / once / 2-3 times / 4-11 times / once a month] 
0.69 
How many times did you visit an opera in the past 12 months? 
[not / once / 2-3 times / 4-11 times / once a month] 
0.74 
How many times did you visit a play or show in the past 12 
months? [not / once / 2-3 times / 4-11 times / once a month] 
0.78 
R² 57.11 
Cronbach‟s α 0.74 
N 765 
Source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006  
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Table 3: measurement cultural insecurity 
Items Factor loadings 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you can‟t be too careful in life? [most people can be trusted 
/ you can‟t be too careful] 
0.59 
There are so many different ideas about what is right and what is 
wrong, that sometimes one doesn‟t know what to expect [strongly 
disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly 
agree] 
0.85 
Everything changes so rapidly today that one often hardly knows 
what is good and what is bad [strongly disagree / disagree / neither 
agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree] 
0.87 
People like me don't have any say about what the government does 
[disagree / agree] 
0.49 
R² 52.01 
Cronbach‟s α 0.67 
N 765 
Source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006  
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Table 4: zero-order correlations (above diagonal) and partial correlations controlled for 
education (below diagonal) between indicators for economic position (income en 
unemployed), cultural position (cultural participation and cultural insecurity) and 
education. 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(1) Cultural 
insecurity 
1.00 -0.29*** -0.11** -0.37*** 0.01 
(2) Cultural 
participation 
-0.22*** 1.00 0.08* 0.29*** -0.04 
(3) Income -0.07 0.05 1.00 0.11** -0.06 
(4) Education - - - 1.00 0.01 
(5) Unemployed 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 - 1.00 
N = 765 
Source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006, Atlas of 
Municipalities 2004, and Statline, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (own calculations). 
***p<0.001; ** p< 0.01; * p< 0.05. 
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Table 5: ethnocentrism of the native population in the 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations. (Multilevel regression analysis; entries are 
regression coefficients; estimation: maximum likelihood) 
 Null 
Model Model 1 Model2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7a Model 7b 
Independents 
individual level 
β β β β β β β β β 
Constant 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.07 -0.04 
Education  
-
0.26*** 
-
0.25*** 
-
0.21*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.14* 
Income   -0.09** -0.09* -0.07* -0.08* -0.07* -0.08* -0.08* 
Unemployed   -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Cultural 
participation    
-
0.12*** -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Cultural 
insecurity     0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
Independents          
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city level 
Postindustrialism      -0.09~ -0.09 -0.09 0.05 
Economic 
opportunity 
structure        0.08  
Bohemian index         -0.17~ 
Cross-level 
interactions          
Postindustrialism 
* education       0.08~ 0.08~ 0.00 
Economic 
opportunity 
structure * 
education        -0.01  
Bohemian index 
* education         0.10~ 
Controls          
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Gender  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
Age  -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Year  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Immigrant share        -0.06 -0.04 
Variance city 
level 
 (N = 22) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Variance 
individual level 
(N = 765) 0.95 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Random slope 
education*10      0.10 0.04 0.04 0.01 
Deviance 2069.01 2008.49 2001.71 1990.56 1951.44 1945.19 1942.75 1940.29 1935.44 
DF  3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006, Atlas of Municipalities 2004, and Statline, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
(own calculations). 
***=p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 two-sided. ~ p<0.1 one-sided. 
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Table 6: ethnocentrism of the native population in the 22 Dutch metropolitan 
agglomerations. (Multilevel regression analysis; entries are regression coefficients; 
estimation: maximum likelihood) 
 Less educated Higher educated 
 Null Model Model 1a Null model  Model 1b 
Independents β β β β 
Constant 0.31*** 0.21** -0.27*** -0.27*** 
Bohemian index  -0.25**  -0.12~ 
Controls     
Gender  0.03  0.05 
Age  -0.05  0.04 
Year  -0.02  -0.06 
Immigrant share  -0.04  -0.00 
Variance city level 
 (N = 22) 0.07* 0.01 0.03~ 0.01 
Variance individual 
level 1.14*** 1.14*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
Deviance 1127.46 1117.40 859.99 854.23 
DF  4  4 
N 384 384 381 381 
Source: Cultural Change in the Netherlands Surveys 2004 and 2006, Atlas of 
Municipalities 2004, and Statline, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (own calculations). 
***=p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 two-sided. ~ p<0.1 one-sided.
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Caption figure 1 
 
Figure 1: the ethnocentrism of less-educated natives (dotted line) and higher-educated 
natives in the 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations by the level of tolerance of the urban 
cultural atmosphere 
 
Caption figure 2 
 
Figure 2: the 22 Dutch metropolitan agglomerations 
 
 
